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MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War against Japan
DAVID W. HOGAN, JR.

From Parameters, Spring 1995, pp. 104-115.
To begin a study of American theater-level organization and conduct of special operations in the war with Japan, one
can consider two images. First, picture native stevedores at a port in the occupied Philippines unloading, under cover
of darkness, crates of cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, candy bars, sewing kits, and pencils from a huge cargo
submarine, each item bearing the inscription "I shall return" over a facsimile of the signature of General Douglas
MacArthur. Then imagine Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell at lunch with members of his personal staff in the
dining room of the Imperial Hotel in New Delhi, India when, at an adjacent table, an officer of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) stands up and opens his bush jacket. Five pigeons, freed from confinement, rush into the air and
disappear through an open window in the ceiling. The general leaps from his chair, but, after a momentary glare at the
perpetrator, resumes his seat and his meal without further ado.[1]
The two vignettes say much about MacArthur, Stilwell, and their respective approaches to special operations in the
Southwest Pacific and China-Burma-India theaters. MacArthur appears in his role, both bestowed and selfmanufactured, as symbol of resistance, spiritual leader, and redeemer of the Philippine nation in its hour of need.
Stilwell comes across as the hard-boiled pragmatist who could tolerate a band of free-spirited eccentrics as long as
they produced results. In the context of an Army which had given little prewar thought to what we today call special
operations, each commander had to make his own way in a largely unfamiliar field with little if any guidance from
doctrine on the place of special operations in theater organization and strategy. Considering the contributions which
special operations made in the two theaters, they did quite well.
The Aristocrat and the Doughboy
The suave, charismatic MacArthur seemed uniquely qualified to direct special operations in the Southwest Pacific
theater (SWPA). Imaginative, widely read, with a quick, flexible intellect, he sensed the importance of spiritual and
moral, as opposed to material, factors in warfare, and he knew from history and his father's own experiences in the
Philippines how effective a force of guerrillas could be. Even for an American Army officer, his extensive experience
and close ties with the Philippines were unusual. He had lived much of his life in the islands, adopting them as his
home, and he had long been involved in the task of creating a national identity for the Philippines, notably through his
service as field marshal of the fledgling Philippine army in the years before the war. He had a keen sense for Filipino
politics and had established close friendships with Filipino leaders, particularly Commonwealth President Manuel
Quezon, the godfather of MacArthur's son and contributor of a $500,000 nest egg to his former field marshal's bank
account. These considerable ties of emotion and self interest were sealed by MacArthur's genuine and deep sense of
obligation to those he had left behind on Bataan and Corregidor and his near obsessive need to remove the blot of
those defeats from his record.[2]
In most respects, Stilwell was about as different from MacArthur as can be imagined. In contrast with MacArthur's
aloofness, urbane grace, and aristocratic paternalism, Vinegar Joe prided himself on his candor, lack of polish or
pretension, and identification with the common soldier. Having served extensively in China during the interwar years,
he knew the country and could speak Chinese fluently, but his tendency to let people know what he thought of them
ill-suited him for a post with such strong diplomatic overtones. Yet, the abrasive exterior concealed a keen
intelligence, a willingness to innovate, and, like MacArthur, an unusually great sensitivity to Asiatic cultures. His acid
was balanced by a human kindness and an ironic sense of humor which could tolerate the mavericks often found in the
special operations community. Like MacArthur, Stilwell had a score to settle. For a man who had despised the
Japanese since a visit to Japan in the 1920s, defeat in the Burma campaign of early 1942 must have been a bitter pill to
swallow. He was, therefore, inclined to be open-minded toward anyone who could help him avenge that defeat and

regain Burma.[3]
From the time he assumed command of US Army forces in the Far East in July 1941, MacArthur displayed both an
interest in special operations and a desire to keep independent practitioners out of his theater. Early in his tenure, he
maneuvered to cut Philippine High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre out of war preparations, and he would manage to
limit the Department of the Interior's role in Philippine affairs for the rest of the war. Similarly, he and his staff
blocked all attempts by William J. Donovan's OSS to gain a foothold in the theater until the closing days of the
conflict. Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, SWPA's vain and domineering intelligence chief, later claimed that
MacArthur, in the midst of a shooting war, could not afford to wait for the new OSS to establish itself in the theater,
but the explanation does not ring entirely true. MacArthur and his staff were apparently suspicious of semiautonomous agencies with a separate chain of command back to Washington, and they also believed themselves to be
quite capable of handling special operations in the Philippines without any help from the OSS.[4]
MacArthur's expertise in special operations was belied by his initial performance. Before the outbreak of the war, he
had given some thought to guerrilla warfare by Filipino reservists and had taken steps to organize an underground
intelligence service among Filipino officials and American residents of the islands, but these plans amounted to very
little. MacArthur overestimated both the time available before the Japanese attack and the ability of his force to halt the
enemy on the beaches, and he did not want to dampen Filipino morale by premature preparations for guerrilla warfare.
When the Japanese broke through his beach defenses, forcing a withdrawal into Bataan, MacArthur improvised as best
he could, organizing an intelligence net based in Manila, sending officers behind Japanese lines to organize resistance,
and accelerating preparations for guerrilla operations in Mindanao and the other southern islands. Evacuated to
Australia, he hoped to direct guerrilla warfare from his theater headquarters there. Unfortunately for his plans, the War
Department designated Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright as the commander of all American troops in the
Philippines, and, when Wainwright surrendered in May 1942, he ordered all units under his command to follow suit,
uprooting most of the seeds sown by MacArthur. Not until late 1942 did a largely spontaneous guerrilla movement
finally contact MacArthur in Australia.[5]
Whereas MacArthur was interested in special operations from the beginning, Stilwell had to be sold on such activities.
An orthodox soldier and admirer of infantry, he initially dismissed guerrilla warfare and sabotage as "illegal action"
and wanted to concentrate on building a powerful Chinese army. Nevertheless, the potential for special operations in
his China-Burma-India theater (CBI) drew the kind of entrepreneurs that MacArthur had kept out of the Philippines.
When Commander Milton S. Miles arrived in May 1942 with vague orders from the Navy Department to undertake
operations which would do maximum possible damage to the enemy, Stilwell, eager to hit back at the Japanese in some
way, gave him free and exclusive control over special operations in CBI. Two months later, Major Carl Eifler, an old
acquaintance from Stilwell's interwar service on the Mexican border,[6] appeared in Chungking at the head of an OSS
mission that Stilwell had initially rejected. The CBI commander sent him to Burma, as much to keep him clear of
Miles in China as for any other reason. Over time, Stilwell's estimation of special operations rose, partly due to his
close relationship with Eifler and partly out of fascination with the Kachin natives among whom Eifler's OSS
Detachment 101 worked, but mostly because of the valuable intelligence which Eifler's men were providing by early
1943.[7]
Command and Control
Both Stilwell and MacArthur dealt directly with their special operations chiefs but at different levels of involvement.
While MacArthur left many details of Philippine affairs in the hands of his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Richard
K. Sutherland, he insisted on personally interviewing escaped prisoners and returning agents from the islands and
otherwise kept in close touch with developments through Colonel Courtney A. Whitney, whom Sutherland brought into
the theater in May 1943 to take charge of the Philippine Regional Section. A former lawyer and acquaintance of
MacArthur in prewar Manila, Whitney has acquired a reputation as a sycophant who, according to Paul Rogers,
"simply mirrored what he thought was the true MacArthur." Attempting to pacify an aggrieved guerrilla leader,
Whitney wrote:
In my own case when recommendations I have made have been partially or wholly disapproved, despite
my conviction that I was right in the first instance, I have always sought to find the soundness in his

[MacArthur's] decision and I have never failed to do so. This results in a wholehearted acceptance of
adverse decisions and much happier resulting service. I think that once you realize that it is General
MacArthur and he alone who defines all Philippine policies and makes the decisions upon questions
emanating from the Islands you too will find the way to see in his decisions, however contrary to your
views, constructive soundness. By that I do not mean that we are a bunch of "yes" men around the General
in these matters--to the contrary we are as independent as a bunch of "hogs on ice." But ours is the pick
and shovel work in the orientation of policy for his consideration--his the final word.[8]
Whitney was apparently responsible for the decision to create, in SWPA propaganda, a cult around MacArthur and his
pledge to return, a campaign which, however effective in some quarters, led some guerrillas to adopt the derisive
motto, "We Remained!" Still, the Colonel did possess a keen, if rather conservative and paternalistic, sense for
Philippine issues, and, more important, he enjoyed the ear of his commander.[9]
The emergence of Whitney's Philippine Regional Section (PRS) ignited a turf battle within MacArthur's theater
headquarters. Before Whitney arrived, special operations in SWPA, including the work of the PRS, came under the
Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB), an inter-Allied agency which operated under the coordination of Willoughby's
intelligence section (G-2). As the activities of the PRS in establishing Filipino agent nets and supporting guerrillas
expanded during the spring of 1943, however, the section achieved a semi-independent status, under which Whitney
reported directly to MacArthur and Sutherland, although he continued to coordinate his activities through G-2 and
relied heavily on the AIB for support. The PRS's status irritated Willoughby, who, in late February 1944,
recommended that Philippine activities be split among the staff sections. As Allied forces neared the islands in late
May, Sutherland acted, assigning intelligence tasks to G-2, supply to G-4, and direction of guerrillas to the G-3
Operations subsection; but instead of assigning Whitney to G-2 as Willoughby had hoped, he detailed the bulk of the
PRS and its chief to G-3 Operations. Despite petty sniping from G-2 over such matters as PRS's waste of maps and
poor standards for dispatches, Whitney's stature with MacArthur continued to grow, to the point that by war's end he
had become MacArthur's chief confidant.[10]
Compared to MacArthur, Stilwell took a more detached approach to special operations, working directly with Miles
and Eifler when necessary but giving them an almost entirely free hand. In theory, the intelligence section of Stilwell's
rear headquarters echelon in New Delhi supervised Detachment 101's operations, but in practice Eifler often dealt
directly with Stilwell. Eifler would be waiting at the airstrip when Stilwell's plane, dubbed "Uncle Joe's Chariot," made
one of its periodic stops in Detachment 101's area. More often than not, Stilwell would notice the burly colonel, call
out, "Buffalo Bill! Come on over!" and then introduce Eifler to senior officers as the "Army's number one thug." Eifler
would take the opportunity to report, answer questions, and make requests. On at least one occasion, Stilwell
intervened to provide Eifler with an advance when his OSS superiors in Washington were not forthcoming with
needed funds. Once the 1944 campaign in North Burma began, Detachment 101 came directly under Northern Combat
Area Command (NCAC), Stilwell's tactical headquarters, and its activities were controlled by Stilwell in person.[11]
Detachment 101 was fortunate to have direct access to Stilwell, for the special operations chain of command in the
CBI theater was a nightmare. At the Navy Department's insistence, Miles had a separate chain of command back to
Washington, although Stilwell supposedly had complete authority over Miles where "necessary." To avoid
jurisdictional clashes with Miles, Donovan agreed to designate him as the OSS Strategic Services Officer (SSO) for
the theater, but the arrangement did not work well. Miles was determined to remain independent of OSS, which, in
turn, increasingly saw him as a tool of the Chinese and an obstacle to their plans for an espionage net in China free of
foreign control. At first, Stilwell got along well with Miles and backed those activities which he thought might prove
productive, but he came to regard Miles as a loose cannon when the latter attempted to expand his sphere by sending
liaison officers to the 14th Air Force and Lord Louis Mountbatten's new Southeast Asia Command. After a visit to the
theater in late 1943, Donovan removed Miles as OSS's theater chief, relieved an exhausted Eifler, and extensively
reorganized OSS in the theater. Colonel John Coughlin became the new SSO, reporting directly to Stilwell and
possessing supervisory authority over Detachment 101, now under Colonel W. R. Peers.[12]
Even if special operations agencies could straighten out the chain of command within the theaters, they still faced
difficulties in securing cooperation from the more conventional services, which could be counted on to view their
unorthodox enterprises with skepticism. Since those agencies were not self-sufficient, they had to rely at least partly

on the services for support when the services themselves were struggling with inadequate resources. Fortunately, the
services soon understood the benefits that special operations could provide to them. In Burma, Eifler pointed out to the
commander of the Air Transport Command the value of operatives who could help downed pilots escape from the
forbidding North Burma jungle, and the general arranged for Eifler's command to parachute agents into the region.
Tenth Air Force later expressed its gratitude for the target acquisition and other intelligence provided by the
detachment by giving an L-5 liaison plane to Peers. In SWPA, the Seventh Fleet was hesitant to divert submarines
from other missions to run supplies into the occupied Philippines, but Whitney's PRS offered coast-watcher stations
and naval intelligence in return for supply missions and radios. Those missions were arranged by Lieutenant
Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons, chief of the PRS's support effort, and Captain A. H. McCollum, Director of
Naval Intelligence for the US Seventh Fleet, and they were carried out by Seventh Fleet's "Spy Squadron" of
submarines.[13]
Informal working relationships and salesmanship could ease many problems of cooperation between special operations
agencies and the services, but they could not always overcome differences among allies separated by politics and
culture. In SWPA, the AIB had originally been created in July 1942 to bring under one roof several mainly-Australian
organizations involved in intelligence collection, sabotage, and propaganda. An Australian "controller" provided loose
coordination under the overall direction of MacArthur's headquarters. Unfortunately, national, philosophical, and
personal differences within the AIB caused it to pull in different directions, resulting in its reorganization in early 1943
along the lines of Australian, Dutch, and American spheres of interest, rather than function. From the viewpoint of
MacArthur's headquarters, AIB's "intermittent mania for complete independence" and tendency to go off on "semipolitical" tangents from the main focus of the theater, the drive to the Philippines, provided a constant irritant.
MacArthur's grant of semi-independent status to the PRS, like his designation of Sixth Army as Alamo Force,
probably represented a tactic to remove Philippine affairs, in which he possessed both a national and personal interest,
from any control by the Australian-dominated AIB.[14]
In CBI, Stilwell had to work not only with the Chinese, but also with the British, sovereign in India and prewar rulers
of Burma. Miles may have been correct in his insistence that it was impossible to conduct special operations in China
without going through the Chinese government, but that did not make dealing with the byzantine, corrupt Chinese
bureaucracy any easier. As for the British bureaucracy in India, it had its own misgivings about special operations and
vigorously opposed the establishment of an independent American intelligence net in India. With regard to OSS
operations in Burma, it expressed much more tolerance, but OSS Detachment 101's relations with its British allies
were often turbulent, particularly when Special Operations Executive/India infringed on what Eifler considered his
turf. Into this picture came Lord Mountbatten's new Southeast Asia Command, an Allied headquarters established by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff in late 1943 to infuse new vigor into the war in Burma. For the 1944 offensive into
Burma, the Allies envisioned an expanded role for Major General Orde C. Wingate's long-range penetration groups,
which would include a new American contingent code-named Galahad. The prospect of the only American combat
unit in the theater serving under a British general was enough to arouse every Anglophobic instinct in Stilwell, and
when Wingate stated that he could not use Galahad before April 1944, Stilwell prevailed on Mountbatten to transfer
Galahad to his control.[15]
Roles and Missions
Along with complications of command and control, MacArthur and Stilwell faced the problem of defining new
concepts in a field that had received little attention in the prewar Army. Within SWPA there existed several differing
views on the proper role and capabilities of guerrillas. In March 1943, MacArthur, in accord with Quezon's wishes,
directed the guerrillas to "lie low" and focus on organization and intelligence. The order seemed sensible at the time
and undoubtedly spared many Filipinos from reprisals, but it created problems for guerrilla commanders who found it
hard to remain idle in the face of popular demand for action against a brutal occupation. When Whitney arrived in
May 1943, he pushed for more aggressive exploitation of the guerrilla potential by forming a battle detachment in
every area and arming every guerrilla by the time of liberation. More often than not, his views prevailed, due to
MacArthur's emotional commitment to the guerrillas, and the PRS expanded its supply effort into the islands. By the
eve of the invasion of Leyte in October 1944, however, SWPA and Sixth Army still took care to list combat
intelligence as the primary mission for guerrillas and warned against their use in attacks on fixed positions.
Significantly, the guerrillas on Leyte would come under Sixth Army's intelligence section during the invasion.[16]

Within the CBI theater, considerable debate existed over the proper role of long-range penetration groups. The Army
guide to these units, taken almost entirely from Wingate's report, stated that they consisted of separate, self-contained
columns which, supplied by air and directed by radio from a group headquarters, would operate independently for as
long as three months deep in enemy territory. The main point of dispute seems to have been whether these columns
would operate more or less independently against Japanese communications or in closer coordination with units in
contact with the principal Japanese forces. The orthodox Stilwell took the latter point of view, envisioning Galahad as
a kind of strategic cavalry conducting envelopments around the Japanese flank while his Chinese divisions advanced
on the enemy front. Whatever his view of Galahad's eventual mission, however, he seems to have viewed this "toughlooking lot" first and foremost as a model, the American combat unit he had long been seeking to show the Chinese
how to fight. It is interesting in this regard that the commanders of Galahad, while they noted differences in training
and organization between their unit and other American formations, seem to have viewed themselves more as
conventional infantrymen than as a special force.[17]
During the initial stages of the drive down the Hukawng Valley in February and March 1944, Stilwell took precautions
against misuse of Galahad. For the command of Galahad, he chose Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, an old intimate
and former theater G-3 who had already been involved in planning the campaign. Throughout the campaign, Stilwell
stayed in close touch with Merrill, often planning operations with him. In late February, following his concept of longrange penetration groups, Stilwell sent Galahad on a march around the Japanese right flank to cut the enemy's line of
retreat at Walawbum while the Chinese attacked in front. At the same time, he ordered Merrill to avoid unnecessary
heavy combat. Galahad carried out its mission, but the glacial pace of the Chinese advance left Merrill's 3000 lightly
armed troops exposed to a riposte by the Japanese 18th Division, forcing the Americans to evacuate their roadblocks.
After the battle, Stilwell told Merrill that he would never again leave one of his few American combat units in such an
exposed position. For the next envelopment to Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng, Merrill arranged for two Chinese
regiments to follow and take over the roadblocks, leaving Galahad free to use its light, mobile battalions to best
advantage.[18]
Much as Stilwell and Merrill would have liked to spare Galahad from prolonged line duty, circumstances and coalition
politics intervened. When a Japanese force threatened to outflank Galahad's own envelopment toward Inkangahtawng,
Stilwell's staff, in his absence, ordered Merrill to establish a blocking position. At Nhpum Ga, Merrill's 2d Battalion
stopped the Japanese but at a heavy cost in dead and wounded. Although Galahad desperately needed rest and
reorganization, Stilwell was eager to capture the key airstrip at Myitkyina before the monsoon season. Believing that
Galahad was his only reliable unit, Stilwell ordered Merrill to strike for the airfield. Revived by promises of a long rest
upon completion of the mission and reinforced by Chinese troops and Kachins, Galahad drove over the rugged Kumon
range and captured the airstrip in a surprise attack on 17 May. At that point, Galahad could reasonably have expected
relief, but Stilwell could not afford to rest his Americans while other nationalities who were equally exhausted
continued to fight. Nor could Stilwell get reinforcements from other sectors of the Allied front. Thus, Galahad stayed
in line, desperately throwing ill-trained fillers into the ranks to replace veterans evacuated with wounds and disease,
with disastrous results for unit morale. Only a fraction of the unit remained by the fall of Myitkyina on 3 August
1944.[19]
Contributions to Victory
Galahad's tragic fate obscured a generally good record for special operations in the CBI theater. True, special
operations in China, Indochina, and Thailand did not really get under way until the last months of the war. In Burma,
however, the effort that Stilwell authorized in 1942 paid off handsomely. OSS Detachment 101 provided much
essential information, including, by Peers' estimate, up to 90 percent of Northern Combat Area Command's intelligence
in the 1944 offensive. Its Kachin confederates also guided and screened columns, helped downed fliers to escape, and
provided a potent guerrilla army. Galahad's sacrifice made possible the capture of Myitkyina, greatly easing the aerial
transport of supplies over the Hump and making it possible for the Ledo Road from India to link up with the North
Burma road system on its way to a final junction with the old Burma Road. If Stilwell thought about it at the time of
his relief in October 1944, he could have taken considerable pride in CBI's performance of special operations during
his tenure.[20]
After a rocky start, the investment of MacArthur and his staff in the Filipino guerrillas likewise paid off to a large

degree. Although often plagued by internal rivalries and, despite SWPA's efforts, lack of resources, the guerrillas still
performed valuable services in guiding American units, harassing Japanese movements, assisting downed pilots,
guarding captured areas, and eliminating bypassed enemy detachments, thereby releasing American troops for other
duties. Guerrilla reports, though often exaggerated and unreliable, still represented the single most important source of
intelligence for American forces. Volckmann's North Luzon guerrillas actually approached Whitney's dream of a
guerrilla army. As for the Filipinos themselves, the guerrilla experience left several troubling issues to resolve after the
war, but it also provided a people with a badly needed sense of national pride on the eve of full independence in
1946.[21]
MacArthur and Stilwell were different men who took different approaches to special operations in their respective
theaters. MacArthur's was based on a romantic vision, drawn from history and legend, of a people's war against brutal
oppressors. The SWPA commander turned to special operations early, developed an extensive support organization,
and closely supervised its work. Stilwell's approach was more cautious and pragmatic, judging special operations
entrepreneurs by their results. Although he permitted direct access and made sure that the special operators obtained
their share of resources, he generally adopted a hands-off tack, giving each entrepreneur a mission and letting him
carry it out without much interference. Yet, for all their differences, the two commanders shared some basic traits.
Both, by the late spring of 1942, were driven men, eager to avenge recent defeats and ready to adopt almost any means
to achieve victory over a despised enemy. Thus, while both were basically orthodox soldiers who relied on the big
battalions, both were ready to turn to special operations to aid conventional forces. Because of their support, special
operations forces were able to make significant contributions to victory in the war against Japan.
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